Abstract Community rating in social health insurance calls for risk adjustment in order to eliminate incentives for risk selection. Swiss risk adjustment is known to be insufficient, and substantial risk selection incentives remain. This study develops five indicators to monitor residual risk selection. Three indicators target activities of conglomerates of insurers (with the same ownership), which steer enrollees into specific carriers based on applicants' risk profiles. As a proxy for their market power, those indicators estimate the amount of premium-, health care cost-, and risk-adjustment transfer variability that is attributable to conglomerates. Two additional indicators, derived from linear regression, describe the amount of residual cost differences between insurers that are not covered by risk adjustment. All indicators measuring conglomerate-based risk selection activities showed increases between 1996 and 2009, paralleling the establishment of new conglomerates. At their maxima in 2009, the indicator values imply that 56 % of the net risk adjustment volume, 34 % of premium variability, and 51 % cost variability in the market were attributable to conglomerates. From 2010 onwards, all indicators decreased, coinciding with a pre-announced risk adjustment reform implemented in 2012. Likewise, the regressionbased indicators suggest that the volume and variance of residual cost differences between insurers that are not equaled out by risk adjustment have decreased markedly since 2009 as a result of the latest reform. Our analysis demonstrates that risk-selection, especially by conglomerates, is a real phenomenon in Switzerland. However, insurers seem to have reduced risk selection activities to optimize their losses and gains from the latest risk adjustment reform.
Introduction
It has long been known that, if not accompanied by additional measures, community rated health insurance premiums can lead to risk selection [1] . Because observable characteristics like sex and age are correlated with health care expenditures (HCE), it is easy for insurers to distinguish between potentially profitable and expensive risks. If not counteracted on, insurers have a high incentive to keep potentially expensive individuals out or to make them leave. Newhouse defined risk selection as the exploitation of unpriced risk heterogeneity and the break-up of pooling arrangements, to the effect that low-risk insured no longer contribute to HCE of high-risk individuals in a desired manner [2] . Van Kleef et al. [3] later amended this definition by stating that any behavior leading to risk selection should be judged by outcomes and intentions.
Numerous studies have performed investigations into residual selection incentives of different risk-adjustment schemes. For example, Stam et al. [4] evaluated several risk-adjustment models in the Netherlands by comparing predicted expenditures with ''normative'' health costs (which are predicted costs based on risk-adjustment regression models with additional factors included to reduce the omitted variables bias). Along the same lines, van Kleef et al. [5] estimated the average amount of over-and undercompensation by different types of risk-adjustment models for several pre-defined groups. Evaluations of U.S. risk adjustment were performed by Shen and Ellis, who estimated the maximally attainable risk selection profits for insurers under different risk-adjustment schemes, given their own, private information [6] . Their approach was later adapted for Switzerland by Beck et al., who concluded that the most recent Swiss risk-adjustment reform (implemented in 2012) could indeed reduce selection incentives substantially [7] .
While such studies on residual risk selection incentives are very informative with regards to the potential for risk selection, they do not address the question of whether and how those potentials are exploited by insurers. Such investigations into the extent of risk selection activities by insurers are very challenging, as already noted by Van Kleef et al. [3] . These researchers reviewed possibilities for risk selection in the Dutch health insurance market and arrived at recommendations for how risk selection could be monitored. In particular, they suggested analyzing HCE patterns of incoming and leaving insured or comparing target groups for marketing through billboards or TV spots with their respective profitability. Similarly, Altman, Cutler, and Zeckhauser analyzed data from a private health plan provider in the U.S. and were able to demonstrate significant, demography-related differences in retention and attrition to specific health insurance plans, which correlated strongly with expected health care expenditures [8] . The work of Frank, Glazer, and McGuire led to a framework for quantification of selection incentives by estimating ''shadow prices'' [9] . Although originally developed to assess the problem of rationing in managed health care settings, the idea behind their approach also applies to risk adjustment. As a downside, their method requires extensive individual-level data, which are not always available to health authorities.
To our knowledge, systematic and nation-wide assessments of risk selection by insurers have never been undertaken so far. Such assessments are of great policy relevance because they enable legislators and health authorities to monitor the impact of risk-adjustment reforms and to identify potentials for improvement. In this article, we aim to develop indicators for assessing whether and how insurers respond to changes in risk-adjustment legislation. The Swiss case represents an ideal setting for such investigations because the risk-adjustment scheme was left unchanged for almost 15 years between 1996 and 2011, and it is well known that substantial risk selection has occurred during that time [10] . In 2007, the national parliament decided on a first reform of risk adjustment, implemented in 2012, which included a switch from retrospective to prospective payments and the inclusion of a first health care utilization indicator as a proxy for morbidity (in-patient hospital or nursing home stays of three or more days). Therefore, we will also check whether our indicators suggest any response of insurers to this risk adjustment reform.
This article is structured as follows. In the first subsections of the Methods section, we will describe the Swiss setting and a framework for risk selection in Switzerland; subsection three outlines the data that were available for analysis. In the fourth subsection, we will develop and present five indicators to measure different types of risk selection, of which the first three specifically focus on conglomerate activities. The remaining two indicators attempt to measure risk-selection activities by all market participants by measuring the volume of potential riskselection incentives in the market. A presentation of the results then follows, and the article concludes with a comparison of the indicators, and final remarks.
Methods

Setting
The Swiss system of mandatory health insurance is based on the concept of managed competition, with a large number of private insurers, community-rated premium setting, a fixed catalogue of covered treatments, and premium subsidies for individuals in need. Moreover, health plan providers are obliged to accept any application for mandatory health insurance.
Switzerland has implemented an internal risk adjustment scheme (without supplemental funds from the government as in the Netherlands or in Germany). This riskadjustment scheme, originally defined by retrospective redistribution of premiums across sex and 15 age groups, was introduced in 1993 [11] and underwent only minor changes until 2011 [12] . It soon became apparent, however, that such a simplistic risk-adjustment method was not sufficient to eliminate risk selection. For instance, Beck lists several examples of attempts to deter applicants by ignoring their phone calls, losing their applications, or by setting illegal conditions for entry (e.g., coverage exclusions, higher deductibles) [10] . However, such reports are only spurious, which suggests that those methods for risk selection are neither applied systematically, nor are they widespread. A recent Swiss study by Baumgartner and Busato attempted to quantify risk selection by submitting identical applications for different age groups to a large number of insurers and by assessing their response with respect to reaction time and type of offer [13] . Their analysis failed to produce solid evidence for systematic risk selection, but provided interesting insights into the mechanism and architecture of insurance conglomerates, which combine several insurance providers under one brand name. Baumgartner and Busato noted that 22 % of all applications to specific insurers from a conglomerate were answered with an offer from a different carrier of the same conglomerate. This finding reflects what Beck et al. [10] describe as the only systematic approach for risk selection tolerated by authorities. Several insurers have embarked on the strategy to establish daughter companies, but to market them under the same brand name. When a potential customer submits an application, this person will internally be assigned to a specific insurance carrier, thereby separating good risks from bad risks. This mostly happens unknowingly to the applicant because the insurance carriers are located under the same roof and share the same infrastructure. This strategy was initially established by a single insurer, but due to its overwhelming success, several other companies followed suit. As shown in Table 1 , the number of conglomerates rose from two in 2004 to nine in the year 2012, and the number of insured enrolled in conglomerates almost tripled from 25 to 69 % over the same time period. In contrast, the number of insurance carriers has decreased by half, suggesting an ongoing market concentration in mandatory health insurance.
In light of the imperfections of the Swiss risk-adjustment scheme to prevent risk selection, a reform was initiated that successfully passed the national parliament in 2007. Starting in 2012, this reform introduced hospitalization in the previous year as a crude proxy for morbidity. In particular, insurers now receive additional compensation for individuals with three or more continuous hospitalizations or nursing-home days, excluding maternity-related hospital stays. Although a step in the right direction, this additional factor ignores several very costly morbidities, which rarely require hospitalization (such as HIV infections). Further reform steps have recently been decided on by the Swiss parliament and will include the introduction of pharmaceutical cost groups.
Given the timing of the decision for the 2012 risk-adjustment reform in parliament, insurers could have changed their premium policies in 2009 earliest. Furthermore, because of the relatively low annual rate of switchers between insurance carriers (between 5 and 15 % annually), it may take several years to change the composition of an insurer population (i.e., the mix of high-risk and low-risk insured), as demonstrated by the stochastic simulation results displayed in supplementary Figs. 2 and 3. Therefore, it is plausible that insurers have not waited until the last possible moment to respond to the 2012 reform, but started a few years ahead of time. A framework for risk selection in Switzerland Within this study, we will pay particular attention to two aspects of risk selection, which are sorting of insured into health plans and cherry-picking by insurers. The former describes self-selection of insured into insurance contracts based on disease risks, preferences, and contract characteristics. For example, it is well known that individuals with a higher disease risk or existing morbidities favor more comprehensive insurance coverage and good service. In Switzerland, sorting is often observed in the context of voluntary deductibles or limited physician choice (e.g., managed care) in return for premium rebates because both coverage limitations are more frequently taken up by younger and/or healthier individuals.
In contrast, cream-skimming is often referred to as actions by insurance companies to discriminate against high-risk insured, for which the conglomerate strategy is an example. Further strategies involve service-level differences by health plans (changes to coverage are not allowed), such as promptness of replies to customer queries (including enrolment applications), mandatory advance payments for drug purchases, or longer waiting times for reimbursements. Both types of actions-sorting and cream-skimming-result in a break-up of pooling arrangements as defined by Newhouse [2] because less costly insured tend to segregate into lower-cost carriers, thus leading to reduced cross-subsidization from low-risk to high-risk insured. Insurance companies can also undertake (legal) efforts to enhance sorting, for instance by selective advertising or by plan design (e.g., web-based insurance, mandatory advance payments for drugs, etc.) [3] .
Risk selection in social health insurance is undesired from a societal perspective because it hinders insurers from making investments into better efficiency and quality of care for high-risk insured. As already noted by Beck [7] , the current risk-adjustment implementation leaves insurers with selection incentives that still by far exceed potential savings from investments into chronic care. Interestingly, consumer organization rankings suggest that insurance carriers with low premiums also rank low with respect to customer satisfaction [14] . Given the distorted incentives for insurers under the current risk-adjustment scheme, it is very likely that the vast majority of service level differentiations serve the purpose of risk selection and that premium differences between Swiss carriers mainly result out of risk selection [15] .
Conglomerates play a particularly important role for risk selection in Switzerland. Conglomerates can be defined as groups of insurance carriers with the same ownership, regardless of whether the daughter companies are marketed under the same brand or individually. Such conglomerate structures can be exploited for risk selection by presenting new enrolment applicants with offers from the carrier that best matches their risk profile (e.g., young applicants receive offers from low-cost insurers) or by switching lowrisk enrollees to a conglomerate-owned low-premium carrier in order to prevent run-off to less expensive competitors. The mathematical framework in appendix Sect. 1.2 illustrates why and how a conglomerate strategy works. Outsourcing good risks in separate carriers allows insurance conglomerates to offer price-sensitive, young insured very competitive health insurance premiums. Naturally, the conglomerate must control the inflow of high-risk insured-who may also be attracted by the low premium costs-into those low-premium carriers, for example by designing plans to be unattractive for chronically ill and by lowering service quality. The current risk-adjustment scheme is not able to equal out all risk differences between low-price and high-price carriers, to the effect that young insured pay less cross-subsidies within conglomerates than they would in a single large carrier.
Data sets
All analyses were conducted on publicly available, aggregated data sets covering the whole mandatory health insurance market (individual-level data are not publicly available in Switzerland). The aggregated data used in this analysis stemmed from the health insurance supervision authority of the federal office of public health (FOPH) [16] . They include, for the years 1996-2012, the number of insured, the annual per-capita risk-adjustment transfers, and the per-capita health care expenditures for every authorized insurance carrier. Furthermore, additional data on costs and number of individuals-aggregated by sex, age group, and canton (but not by insurer)-are available from http:// www.kvg.org with a 1-year time lag (information on gross and net risk-adjustment turnover can also be retrieved from this website) [14] . Data on health insurance premiums are published by the FOPH on http://www.priminfo.ch. Information regarding ownership of insurance carriers was compiled by systematic searches of trade registers and from publications by the FOPH and santésuisse (the association of Swiss health insurers).
Risk-selection indices for conglomerates
The first set of indicators assess the importance of conglomerates in the Swiss health insurance market. As outlined earlier, the establishment of conglomerates are an important risk-selection strategy and mainly serves the purpose of assigning insured to specific carriers. The indicators aim at quantifying the effect of this break-up of pooling arrangements by conglomerates on premiums, health care expenditures, and risk-adjustment transfers.
Notation
We use the following notations and definitions. The subscript i denotes one out of (1,…, k) insurance companies. The variable n i is the number of insured for insurer i, and P k i¼1 n i ¼ n stands for the total population of insured. Furthermore, P are premiums for mandatory health insurance, E are health care expenditures (after voluntary deductibles and mandatory co-payments), and T are risk adjustment transfers. Variables with a dash ( P; T; E) represent averages.
Premium index
Health insurance premiums are price signals to consumers and predominantly reflect an insurer's cost base. In health insurance markets with effective risk equalization the variance of premiums should be comparably small. The reason is that better forecasts of health care expenditures for vulnerable groups of insured by regulators should lead to less unpriced risk heterogeneity that can be exploited by insurers. It is difficult to distinguish, however, whether residual premium variability reflects gaps in risk equalization or efficiency differences between insurers. Furthermore, premiums are not only influenced by HCE but also by deficits and surpluses in reserves, and to some degree by strategic or political business decisions.
Note that base premiums for individuals aged 26 and older were used for calculations, meaning without voluntary deductibles or physician choice limitation. For cantons with more than one premium region (and hence more than one cantonal base premium per insurer; 11 of 26 cantons), the average over all regions per insurer and canton was included in the calculations.
The premium index is defined as previously described [10] . The frequency-weighted average premium (horizontal dashed black line; Fig. 1 ) in the insurance market is defined by:
By use of this average market premium P we can estimate the absolute magnitude of premium differentiations in the market according to the following equations for an individual insurer i (distance from dots to market average line in Fig. 1 )
and for the whole market (multiplied by the number of enrollees per insurer)
Some insurers i are owned by a conglomerate j, with the total number of insured belonging to the conglomerate defined by n j . For a specific conglomerate j we can calculate the conglomerate-specific average premium. To simplify the notation, we will consider single, independent insurers as a conglomerate with just one insurance carrier. Hence, the average premium for conglomerate j is defined as follows by
By use of the average conglomerate premium (horizontal dash-dotted line in Fig. 1 ) we can now estimate the sum of all premium differentiations in a hypothetical situation where conglomerates were not allowed and the insurance carriers of the conglomerate are aggregated into one single insurer (solid vertical lines in Fig. 1 ). Then we compare these hypothetical conglomerate premium differentiations with actually observed premium differentiations defined by Eq. (2) (distance from dots to market average line in Fig. 1 ). This is achieved by Eq. 5.
This equation calculates, for a specific insurer i who is also a member of the conglomerate j, the difference between observed premium differentiation and expected differentiation if all insurers of conglomerate j were combined into one single carrier. The difference between the two levels of premium differentiation (D i;j ) is graphically illustrated by vertical dotted grey lines in Fig. 1 .
From Eq. (5) follows the equation for the sum of all conglomerate-induced deviations from the market premium for a conglomerate j 
or simplified
With Eqs.
(1-7) we can construct an index for risk selection by conglomerates. This index reports a close approximation for the fraction of premium differences within conglomerates (which serve the purpose of risk selection) over all observed premium differentiations observed in the market.
The index is defined according to Eq. (8).
The index becomes zero if there are no conglomerates (i.e., only independent insurers) or if there are no premium differentiations within conglomerates. It reaches the upper limit of one if all insurers-each of which with its own premium-become part of the same conglomerate. Therefore, the closer the index is to the upper limit of one, the more risk selection owing to conglomerates is observed in the market.
Health care expenditure (HCE) index
The same approach as for the construction of the premium index can also be employed to investigate the impact of conglomerates on the variability of costs between insurers. In particular, the index reflects the segregation of high-risk insured and low-risk insured into separate insurance carriers from the same conglomerate. Contrary to premiums, a well-functioning risk adjustment scheme may not necessarily lead to less variability in costs between insurers. For example, if chronically ill insured were adequately compensated for by risk adjustment, this may lead to the establishment of specialized insurers for chronic care with a high overall average of HCE. Likewise, efficiency gains through cost management could also enhance HCE variability. However, considering the current risk adjustment scheme in Switzerland, which offers almost no incentives for the inclusion of high-cost patients or cost-saving efforts in high-risk populations, the HCE index most likely is an accurate measure for conglomerate-based risk selection.
To estimate the HCE index, we apply the same mathematical notation as above and replace premiums P by reimbursed health care expenditures E. This leads to the following index I E (without explicit derivation):
where by E; E j ; E i are overall average HCE, average HCE for conglomerate j and average HCE for insurer i, respectively. This index measures the variability of the HCE structure within conglomerates and compares it to the overall variability observed in the market. The range and interpretation of index values are analogous to the premium index.
Risk-adjustment transfer index
Next, we develop a measure for risk selection on the basis of average per-capita risk-adjustment transfers between insurers. Risk-adjustment transfers reflect portfolio differences between insurers with respect to age and gender, whereas HCE differences may also stem from differences in efficiency. As with the HCE index, a well-working riskadjustment scheme may not necessarily decrease the variance of risk-adjustment transfers, as specialized chroniccare insurers with high average costs may emerge.
When we replace average HCE in Eq. (9) by predicted HCE (as obtained via a linear regression based on all variables included in risk adjustment), we obtain the following equation.
Note thatÊ i À E ¼ T i andÊ j À E ¼ T j are equivalent to net risk-adjustment transfers when all insurers of a conglomerate j are combined ( T j ), and risk-adjustment transfers for an individual insurer i (T i ), respectively. Hence, changing the notation to T leads to equation
However, due to the outer absolute value symbol in the numerator of the equation, this index does not distinguish between negative or positive effects on risk-adjustment volume. In situations where insurer-specific risk-adjustment transfers are smaller than conglomerate-based transfers, Eq. (11) overestimates the conglomerate-induced transfer fraction. This can be rectified by skipping the outer absolute value symbols, in which case the equation simplifies to
In practice, the difference between Eqs. (11) and (12) is minor. When estimated by method (12) , the index is consistently smaller, with a maximum deviation of -4 % points relative to estimates obtained with (11) , although the longitudinal pattern remains unchanged. This index based on net risk-adjustment transfers has an interesting interpretation. It signifies the fraction of the net risk-adjustment volume that is attributable to conglomerate structures.
Tests for randomness of indicator changes
In order to assess the effectiveness of risk adjustment, it is important to check whether the observed indicator variation reflects true changes or random noise. Standard statistical significance tests may not be appropriate for this purpose because the indicators most likely do not conform to a specific probability distribution and possibly are also affected by the ongoing market concentration (Table 1) . Thus, we chose to develop a stochastic simulation model to emulate a market in which risk selection is absent. The mathematical definition of this null model is described in detail in the supplementary materials.
In brief, we model populations of high-risk and low-risk individuals and assume that they can switch insurance carriers unhindered, i.e. that there is no risk selection. Then we monitor how those different populations would have mixed and how HCE should have equalized out across insurers, given the observed growth of insurance carriers and the turnover of insured (i.e., switches between insurance carriers). Three processes contribute to changes in the mix of risks within insurers (which affect all risk groups equally): mergers between carriers, loss or growth of insured, and exchange (equal number of exits and entrances of insured that does not result in a net loss or gain). These processes are simulated by random sampling from binomial distributions. Owing to this random element in our simulation, the outcomes (i.e., the number of expected higher risks and average HCE) for a given year vary between simulation runs. Therefore the simulations were repeated 100 times to assess the variability of results.
Indicators derived from regression analyses between observed costs and net risk-adjustment transfers
Next, we derive two indicators from regression analyses of risk-adjustment transfers on HCE. In contrast to the three indices presented above, the regression indices focus on the volume of residual risk-selection incentives in the health insurance market, defined by cost differences between insurers that are not equalized out by risk adjustment.
Like before, T i is the per-capita risk-adjustment transfer for insurer i. Note that negative amounts of T i reflect net payments into the risk-adjustment fund and positive amounts are payments from the fund. E i is the insurerspecific HCE average. We now perform a simple linear regression of T i (dependent variable) on E i À E ¼ DE i (independent variable), weighted by the number of enrollees n i per insurance company. The regression equation for a given year is therefore defined by
Mathematically, this regression (13) leads to simple algebraic expressions because the frequency-weighted averages of DE i and T i , D E and T, are both zero (for proofs see supplementary materials).
We will focus on two types of parameters that can directly be derived from the regression, which are b E and R 2 (for a detailed derivation see supplementary materials).
The b E -coefficient describes how cost differences are equaled out by risk adjustment and is defined by
Thus, a one unit deviation in HCE from the population average triggers an amount of b E in risk adjustment payments.
The coefficient of determination R 2 explains how much variability is explained by the regression and is defined by
In the context of risk adjustment, R 2 is also a measure for how well insurers ''align'' along the cost-exchange curve defined by regression Eq. (13) . For example, a wide scatter may suggest that insurers ignore risk adjustment (or can circumvent its effects). It is easy to show that R 2 is 1 if Moreover, a regression with DE i as the dependent and T i as the independent variable can be performed as follows.
Although results are quite similar (the value for R 2 stays the same, for example), the interpretation of (16) compared with (13) is slightly different. The risk-adjustment transfer T i is derived from predictions of a HCE regression on 30 risk groups (2012: 60 risk groups) and is therefore already controlled for all variables included in the risk-adjustment model. The residuals from model (16) therefore gain an interesting interpretation: They represent the amount of HCE that are not recognized (and therefore not equaled out) by risk adjustment (note that the residuals in (13) do not have such an intuitive meaning).
We will make use of this interpretation by constructing a further measure to assess the efficiency of risk adjustment named RAD, which stands for ''ratio of absolute deviations''. This measure is defined by the ratio of the sum of absolute residuals DE i À b T ðT i Þ j jover the sum of observed absolute cost differences DE i j j, leading to Eq. (17) .
This measure defined by (17) reflects the fraction of cost differences that are not equalized out by risk adjustment. As a caveat for interpretation, those residual cost differences may not necessarily stem from risk-selection activities, but can also reflect differences in efficiency between insurers.
Results
Premium index
The first indicator I P measures the fraction of health insurance premium variability that is attributable to conglomerate structures. The magnitude of the premium index mirrors the establishment of conglomerates, which intensified from 2006 onwards. As shown by Table 2 (second column), the index peaked at 34 % in 2009, which suggests that one-third of all premium differences observed in the market were caused by conglomerate structures. In subsequent years, the premium index dropped significantly to 27 % in 2011 and increased again by 1 %-point in 2012.
Health care expenditure index Using the same approach as for the measurement of premium variability, we constructed an index I E based on average health care expenditures per insurer. The establishment of conglomerate structures for risk-selection purposes should lead to a greater variance in insurerspecific average health care expenditure levels by assigning insured to risk-specific carriers. Indeed, the fraction of variability attributable to conglomerates increased steadily until 2008 to 51 % and then declined to 43 % until 2012 (Table 2, column 3) .
It is possible, however, that conglomerates do not necessarily serve the purpose of risk selection and that HCE levels are similar across carriers within the same conglomerate. Nevertheless, the index might still respond because of cost differences between carriers by chance alone. In order to distinguish between random and risk-selectiondriven effects on the index, we compared our observations to those from the stochastic simulation model of the Swiss health insurance market (Fig. 2, upper panel) . This null model estimates the amount of baseline HCE variability that is solely due to chance and indeed suggests a sharp increase from 2008 onwards, reflecting the build-up of conglomerate structures (cf. Table 1 ). However, the observed indicator levels were still considerably above simulated levels, which implies that the indicator changes exceed randomness.
Risk-adjustment index
Analogous to the HCE index, the index of risk-adjustment transfers I T also suggests a significant decrease of conglomerate-associated risk-selection activity in later years ( Table 2 , column 4). This index yields an estimate of the magnitude of observed net risk adjustment transfers owing to conglomerate structures alone. The index suggests that between 2008 and 2010 more than half of the net riskadjustment transfer volume was attributable to conglomerate structures, which testifies to the importance of this riskselection strategy in the Swiss health insurance market. In 2012, the index dropped markedly to 37 % from an all-time high of 56 % in 2009. Of note, since 2003 all observed index data points considerably exceed the simulated (random) baseline variability (Fig. 2, lower panel) .
Regression analyses
The second set of indicators, shown in Table 3 , are based on linear regression analyses of risk adjustment transfers and observed differences in average HCE across insurers, weighted by the number of enrollees per insurer. Figure 3 displays such regression analyses for 3 years: The uppermost panel displays data from 2004, the middle panel shows results for 2008 when the indicators from the previous sections were close to their peak, and the bottom panel shows 2012 data (the last available data set). The xaxis plots the deviation of insurer-specific HCE averages from the overall average DE i , the y-axis shows insurerspecific net risk adjustment transfers T i , whereby a negative value indicates transfers into the fund and vice versa. The solid, grey regression line with slope b E reflects the observed cost exchange curve, the dashed, grey 45 degree reference line represents full cost equalization. When looking at these plots, it seems that the spread of data points around the regression line has become smaller in later years, which is also reflected by increasing R 2 values from 83 % in 2004 to 93 % in 2012 (Table 3) . In other words, the data became better aligned around the dashed regression line at later time points, which implies that insurers increasingly responded to risk equalization. Further noteworthy, the slope parameter b E , which indicates how much of the observed HCE deviations are equaled out by risk adjustment, changed very little over time, which reflects that no significant reforms of the Swiss risk adjustment were undertaken until 2012 (Table 3 , column 4).
Unfortunately, the R 2 measure does not yield a meaningful interpretation outside the regression context. We therefore constructed a further index, the RAD, which measures the fraction of observed HCE differences that are not equaled out by risk adjustment. This measure dropped from 56 % to an all-time low of 25 % in 2012 (Table 3 , column 3). It should be noted, however, that the regression residuals in the numerator of the RAD do not necessarily result out of risk selection. For example, they could also reflect cost saving efforts such as investments into managed care. Essentially, the RAD index provides an estimate of the volume of potential remaining incentives for risk selection.
In order to assess whether insurers respond to risk adjustment we further investigated the distribution of regression residuals over time by using the same regression as for the calculation of the RAD index, with the exception that no weights were applied (defined in supplementary materials).
Boxplots of residuals are shown in the upper panel of Fig. 4 , which suggest that the variance of residuals decreased over time. We tested this hypothesis by running a piecewise regression on the observed standard deviations of residuals (displayed in Table 3 , column 4) for three time intervals (2000-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2012) , which were selected based on the patterns for the premium-and risk-adjustment indices (Fig. 4, lower panel) . Of note, the standard deviation is not directly affected by sample size, respectively, the number of insurers in the market. Overall, this regression model on standard deviations has a very high R 2 of 0.9975 and indicates that the standard deviation was stable in the first period and then experienced a sharp drop as the conglomerate strategy became more widespread (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . In subsequent years (2009 and 2010), the standard deviation remained at stable levels, but then decreased again in 2011 and 2012. This could suggest that insurers have changed their behavior as to reduce the gap between risk adjustment and residual cost differences.
Comparison of indicators
Next, we compared the longitudinal dynamics of the five indicators. Visual inspection and the estimation of all pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients for the five indicators revealed that the HCE indicator and the risk-adjustment indicator are highly correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient 0.99), and the HCE indicator was omitted from further analyses. Likewise, the R 2 and the RAD indicators also show a high negative correlation (-0.97), and R 2 was excluded. Figure 5 plots the dynamics of the remaining three indicators RAD, and the premium and risk adjustment indices. It is apparent that the latter two indicators exhibit similar dynamics. The premium index seems less Whilst the RA index increases steadily over those 3 years, the premium index remains flat. This finding can be explained by the fact that, over this time period, insurers were not allowed to charge cost-covering premiums for political reasons (instead they had to use up reserves to keep premium growth down). This observation suggests that the premium index is not only affected by risk-selection but also by other outer influences. Nevertheless, the premium index can be a valuable tool because it reflects price levels as seen by the consumer.
In comparison, the RAD indicator shows an almost continuous decrease over time, even during the time around 2008 when all other indicators reach their peak height. Analogous to the RA-index, the RAD indicator also shows a substantial drop in 2012, when the new risk-adjustment formula was implemented.
Discussion
By use of statistical analyses of public data sets we have attempted to measure the effectiveness of the current implementation of Swiss risk adjustment in terms of risk selection prevention. In particular, we aimed to study whether insurers responded to the latest refinement of the risk-adjustment scheme, which was decided on in late 2007 and implemented in 2012.
All insurance companies started to revise their strategies in 2010. For example, the largest conglomerate drastically decreased the number of its affiliate companies from 15 to four in 2010. Our conclusion is further supported by results of Beck et al. [7] , who observed that selection incentives for insurers are reduced dramatically when the old, demographybased risk-adjustment scheme is augmented by prior hospitalization as a crude morbidity indicator. Furthermore, a recent evaluation of the 2012 risk-adjustment reformcommissioned by the Federal Office of Public Health-also confirms that incentives for risk selection were substantially reduced by the latest reform, but the report further states that additional refinements are in order [18] . Along the same lines, official risk-adjustment statistics indicate a stagnation of growth for net risk-adjustment transfers from 2009 onwards, whereas the gross sum of transfers experienced a steady increase related to health cost inflation and population aging (supplementary Table 1 ) [17] .
Our measurement methods are not without limitations. They work best for identifying and measuring one specific type of risk selection, namely that of risk segregation within conglomerates of insurers. Other, more subtle types of risk-selection behavior (e.g., additional barriers for entrance, discouragement of applicants, etc.) may only become detectable if affecting a large enough number of insured, which is unlikely given the scrutiny by media and authorities. Moreover, our indices subsume many rather complicated processes into single numbers. While this simplifies monitoring greatly, important processes and dynamics could be missed. At the same time, indicator changes may also be driven by factors other than risk selection, such as gains in efficiency or self-sorting into plans. Table 4 qualitatively summarizes such likely effects of self-sorting, cream-skimming, and cost savings on the indicator values.
Furthermore, the dynamics of our indicators coincide with-and are possibly influenced by-a substantial market concentration in 2011 and 2012, when 18 carriers (22 % of all insurers) were closed down. While it is not possible to establish a firm causality between the developments in the market and changes in risk adjustment, the fact that all but three of those 18 carriers were net contributors to risk adjustment suggests a possible connection. As a further limitation, the indices can only assess risk selection with measurable outcomes, which means that some selection activities may remain undetected. Consequently, our indicators represent a lower bound estimate for risk selection. Likewise, if the indicators do not suggest the existence of risk selection, this is not proof of absence. Hence, more detailed investigations into underlying causes of changes in the market are fundamental for a thorough understanding.
Nevertheless, the fact that the dynamics of several independent indicators lead to similar conclusions and in light of the host of ''soft'' evidence for reductions of riskselection activities in the market, we are convinced that our findings and interpretations are robust. Furthermore, our methods and results are not only important for Switzerland, but also for other settings. The regression-based indicators can readily be implemented to any other country with risk adjustment. Also, the premium-, cost-, and risk-adjustment transfer indices could, for example, be used to monitor the impact of group contracts on the social health insurance market in the Netherlands, which are known as a tool for risk selection [3] .
In summary, our results can be viewed as emerging evidence for changes in risk-selection behavior in Switzerland, induced by the latest risk-adjustment reform. The indicators and benchmarks developed here may help administrators and policy-makers to assess the impact of the current risk-adjustment scheme and to guide them in planning and implementing further modifications.
